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Abstract
Capital derived from immoral sources is increasingly circulated in today’s financial markets.
The moral associations of capital are important, although their impact on investment
remains unknown. This research aims to explore the influence of principal source morality
on investors’ risk preferences. Three studies were conducted in this regard. Study 1 finds
that investors are more risk-seeking when their principal is earned immorally (through lying),
whereas their risk preferences do not change when they invest money earned from neutral
sources after engaging in immoral behavior. Study 2 reveals that guilt fully mediates the
relationship between principal source morality and investors’ risk preferences. Studies 3a
and 3b introduce a new immoral principal source and a new manipulation method to improve
external validity. Guilt is shown to the decrease the subjective value of morally flawed princi-
pal, leading to higher risk preference. The findings show the influence of morality-related
features of principal on people’s investment behavior and further support mental account
theory. The results also predict the potential threats of “grey principal” to market stability.
Introduction
Conflicts between morality and interest are ubiquitous for governments, corporations, and indi-
viduals. Sometimes, such conflicts end with venality, creating “dirty money”. Although dirty
money is hated and despised, large amounts of it are currently circulating in the world’s capital
markets. As estimated by the IMF in 2015, money laundering accounts for more than 5% of
global GDP, and money laundering mainly occurs through investments. Thus, the stability of
global and local markets would be threatened if individuals were less prudent and more risk-
seeking when investing dirty money. However, it remains unclear how the morality of principal
obtaining means impacts investors’ risk preferences. To fill in this knowledge gap, this research
attempts to combine perspectives from both risky decision making and moral psychology.
Preferences in risky decision making
Many studies of risky decision making have focused on individuals’ investment choices. The
identified impact factors mainly fall into three categories: the characteristics of decision
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makers, features of options, and contextual clues. Decision makers’ relevant characteristics
that matter include their age[1], gender[2], regulatory focuses[3], and cultural backgrounds
[4]. However, emotions[5], construal level[6], self-control resources[7], and feelings of power
[8] at the moment of choice are also important factors. Outcome valence, frameworks[9],
probabilities of gains and losses in risky options[10], the amount of money involved[11] and
default choices are all features of investment options that have been considered. Contextual
clues, such as time pressure[12], outcomes of previous decisions[13], and hints of past wins
[14], can also influence individuals’ investment choices.
However, few studies have focused on moral elements or, in particular, on the morality of
the means with which the principal was acquired. In general, venture investments are trade-
offs between less risk of losing capital and the chance to earn larger profits[9]. It is therefore
highly possible that individuals’ investment choices will change if their attitudes toward capital
are altered by the morality of the means by which their capital was obtained.
The fungibility of money
There are conflicting opinions regarding whether individuals use money differently based
on its source. The economic assumption of fungibility argues that the source of money makes
no difference in its consumption[15]. Conversely, mental account theory[16] contends that
people group income into various mental accounts (such as regular income or windfall in-
come), and that money in these distinguished mental accounts is not fungible. Accumulating
evidence is in line with the latter assumption. People’s money consumption varies depending
on whether money is paid to them before or after they provide service to others, the money-
exchanging route (refunded from tokens or coins)[17], and the receiver’s emotion when the
money is acquired[18]. In gambling, people take more risks when they play with previous
gambling gains than with their normal income[19]. During online shopping, consumers
spend windfalls more generously than money from other sources[20]. Therefore, it is also pos-
sible that the morality of the source of capital influences individuals’ attitudes toward capital,
which in turn changes how they invest that capital.
The impact of immoral obtaining means
Money can acquire moral meaning based on its source[21]. People tend to distance themselves
from money with immoral associations and underestimate its value, just as they treat other
items with moral flaws.
Typically, individuals distance themselves from items relating to immoral persons or
immoral behaviors to avoid “moral contamination” [22]. Students are unwilling to wear evil
persons’ shirts [23]. Participants wash their hands for a longer time after shaking hands with a
liar, or even after holding photos of a misbehaving person’s hands[24]. Self-cleansing also
occurs when people themselves behave immorally[25, 26]. Such purposeful distancing is also
apparent with money. According to Carruthers and Espeland [21], the meaning of money
can come from its proximate source, and money earned through disgraceful behaviors has
immoral meanings. When participants blame money for a man’s immoral behavior, they
wash their hands longer after touching cash[24]. After imagining earning money by immoral
means, participants attempt to connect less with the money and thus plan to spend less of that
money on travelling to lessen such connection[27].
When objects are considered immoral, they are less desirable, and their value can be cor-
rupted, which can be reflected in customers’ hesitation[28] and lower bid prices[29] when buy-
ing products from companies known to be morally questionable. Similarly, people are prone
to undervaluation when confronting immoral money. For example, students consider a $50
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participant fee from an unscrupulous enterprise to be less valuable than a $50 participant fee
from a morally neutral company[22].
Based on past findings, we believe that individuals who earn principal by unethical means
will undervalue their principal and attempt to distance themselves from it. Therefore, they will
care less regarding the risk of losing capital, or may even desire to lose it to create distance.
Both mechanisms ultimately involve risker investment choices.
Guilt: A moral emotion
As a moral emotion, the feeling of guilt plays an essential role in forming people’s attitudes
and behavioral tendencies toward immoral objects.
Moral emotions are emotions “that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as
a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent” [30]. These emotions mediate the
relationship between moral values and moral judgements and will influence moral behaviors
[31–33], as a result.
As one of the most important moral emotions, guilt arises when a moral transgression is
one’s own responsibility, the responsibility of individuals to whom one is closely related [34],
or the responsibility of an organization to which one belongs [35]. Guilt drives individuals and
organizations to atone for their wrongdoings[36–38]. More specifically, guilt has been shown
to be the cause for cleansing after immoral behaviors[25, 26, 39]. The authors believe that guilt
may also result in individuals’ intentions to distance themselves from immorally earned
money and devalue it. Therefore, guilt would play a mediation role between the morality of the
means by which capital is obtained and the riskiness of individual investments involving such
capital.
The present research
Based on past studies, we assume that people feel guilty after they earn capital immorally. Guilt
would lead people to get away from contaminated principal and make people regard such
principal as less valuable. Thus, people tend to risk this capital more in investments because
increased risk may help them distance themselves from the capital through loss, and the pain
of loss is lower when the subjective value of capital drops (Fig 1). If this assumption is true,
investors will be more risk-seeking only when their capital is obtained through guilt-causing
behavior but not when they invest with neutral money after feeling guilty about something
else.
Three studies were conducted to test the hypothesis. In study 1, the effect of principal-
source morality on investors’ risk preference and its boundary condition were tested. Study 2
examined the mediating effect of guilt. In studies 3a and 3b, two possible paths linking feelings
Fig 1. Hypothesized mechanism in this research.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.g001
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of guilt to higher risk preferences were examined, and new immoral money-earning situations
were included to increase external validity. The morality of principal earning means was
manipulated via real tasks in the first two studies and by imagination in study 3.
Ethics statement
The current research was approved by the Research Ethics Board of Department of Psychology
and Behavioral Sciences at Zhejiang University. All participants in study1 and study 2 read a
consent form on paper and gave verbal confirmation before the experiment. The participants
in study 3 read their consent form on a computer screen and clicked “confirm” before the
experiment.
Study 1 The impact of principal source morality on investors’ risk
preferences
In study 1, we aimed to uncover the impact of the morality associated with the means by
which principal was earned (hereafter, principal source morality) on investors’ risk preference.
Whether that influence generalizes to investments with moral principal after immoral behav-
iors was also examined. A 2(morality of description: moral/immoral)2(principal’s relevance
to description: relevant/irrelevant) between-subjects design was used. The participant’s choice
between the two investment projects was the dependent variable.
Methods and materials
The sample of this study consisted of 126 (46 males, age M = 20.87, SD = 1.84) undergraduate
and graduate students at Zhejiang University who were recruited from the campus BBS. Each
participant received at least ¥10 as a participant fee.
When the experiment began, each participant repeated a boring action for 10 minutes. (In
pilot study 1, 67(age M = 20.36, SD = 2.35, 35 males) undergraduate students rated how boring
17 tasks were. This task scored 3.87 out of 5(very boring) and was rated the most boring of all
tasks). The participants moved rice grains one by one from bowl A to bowl B continuously
without reading the time or taking rests during the task. Each participant earned ¥10 for the
operation task. Next, the participants rated how interesting the task was on a 9-point scale
(-4 = extremely boring, 4 = extremely interesting, 0 = neutral). Then, the participants described
the task’s interestingness in three sentences following the experimenter’s instructions.
Instructions for the moral description group consisted of the following:
Your descriptions will be used to help recruit future participants. We will show descriptions
of feelings from previous participants to potential participants to help them decide whether to
join the experiment. Please write 3 sentences in your own words to describe your feelings
about the interestingness and attractiveness of the operation task. Please write down these
descriptions in the “Description of Feelings” part on the next page. Make sure that your
descriptions are matter-of-fact (there are no right or wrong answers, please write down your
true feelings).
Participants in the immoral description group read the following instructions:
Your descriptions will be used to help recruit future participants. We will show descriptions
of feelings from previous participants to potential participants to help them decide whether to
join the experiment. Therefore, we need you to describe the operation task as interesting and
attractive. We hope you can write based on our request, no matter what your true feelings are.
There are 10 sentences listed below, and they all describe the operation task as very interesting
and attractive. Make sure you choose 3 from the descriptions provided and copy them to the
“Description of Feelings” part on the next page.
Immorally obtained principal increases investors’ risk preference
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Descriptions provided for the immoral group include “it feels like an interesting game, and
I couldn’t stop playing it!”, and “it was so interesting that I almost forgot the time!”. The partic-
ipants were required to sign under their descriptions to become more involved. In fact, no one
except the experimenter would read the descriptions. Each participant earned ¥10 for finishing
the description (and thus earned ¥20 in total), whether they lied per the experimenter’s request
or wrote their truth feelings in the description. During the experiment process, participants
were informed via text each time they earned a sum of money, and their total income was
summed and cashed together when the experiment finished). They then put ¥10 out of their
¥20 into an investment game (Fig 2). Participants in the description-irrelevant principal group
used the ¥10 from the operation task (irrelevant to moral or immoral behavior) as principal,
and those in the description-relevant principal group used the ¥10 from the description task
(direct gain from moral or immoral behavior). The game was designed to imitate real invest-
ments in the market (In pilot study 2, titration was used to find the equivalent point in a steady
investment project. The study’s participants included 65(age M = 20.42, SD = 2.36, 22 males)
undergraduate students who rated the risk level of the risky investment project as between
“low” and “medium”). The investment game was as follows:
Principal: ¥10
Investment options:
A. Steady project: 100% to gain ¥13 (principal + profit = ¥23)
B. Risky project:
72% to gain ¥25 (principal + profit = ¥35)
10% to gain ¥0 (principal + profit = ¥10)
18% to lose ¥10 (principal + profit = ¥0)
Fig 2. Procedure of study 1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.g002
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Every participant cashed his or her remaining ¥10 immediately after the choice. They were
then debriefed about the deception. No one reported any suspicion. Ten participants were ran-
domly chosen two weeks after the experiment to receive their gains from the investment game.
The chosen participants who picked the steady project in the previous investment game
received ¥23. Furthermore, 72%, 10%, and 18% of those who picked the risky project received
¥35, ¥10, and ¥0 respectively. The subjects were informed in advance about the arrangement
but were not clear about how many of them would be chosen to receive the gains.
Results
All participants in the immoral description groups copied the sentences in the description task
per the experimenter’s instructions. The operational definition of lying in this research is
describing the task as interesting although the participant thought it was boring. Therefore, 12
participants in the immoral description groups (C and D in Fig 2) who initially rated the oper-
ation task as interesting (rated interestingness greater than 0) and were then asked by the
experimenter to describe the task as interesting were excluded. To ensure the comparability
among groups, 17 participants in the moral description groups (A and B in Fig 2) who consid-
ered the operation task interesting were also excluded. A total of 97 participants remained
(all of whom rated the operation task as not interesting, 43 lied in the description task and 54
told the truth, age M = 20.90, SD = 1.69, 37 males). The descriptions from those in the moral
description groups were consistent with their ratings. There were no significant differences of
age or gender among the 4 groups. The participants from the various groups differed in their
ratings of interestingness (there was an interaction of morality of description and principal’s
relevance to description, F = 4.201, df = 1, p = .043). The results did not change when the sub-
jective interestingness of the operation task was included as a covariate.
Significantly more people who lied chose the risky investment project than those who told
the truth (χ2 = 5.108, df = 1, p = .026). The main effect of the principals’ relevance to descrip-
tion was not significant (χ2 = .290, df = 1, p = .684). With gender, age, and the subjective
interestingness of the operation task as covariates, logistic regression revealed a significant
interaction of the two independent variables (p = .048, Table 1). A simple effect analysis
showed that participants who lied preferred the risky project more than those who did not
only when their principal was gained from description (between B and D in Fig 2, χ2 = 8.194,
df = 1, p = .005, F = .320; logistic regression with covariates B = -1.793, p = .009). There was no
Table 1. Results of the logistic regression.
B S.E. df p
Morality of description -3.614** 1.489 1 .015
Principal’s relevance to description -2.589* 1.539 1 .093
Morality of description*Principal’s relevance to description 1.848** 0.936 1 .048
Subjective interestingness of operation task 0.006 0.215 1 .979
Gender -1.056** 0.516 1 .041
Age 0.23 0.148 1 .119
Constant 2.376 3.732 1 .524
*.05p < .1
**.001p < .05
*** p < .001; morality of behavior: 1 = immoral, 2 = moral; source of principal: 1 = relevant, 2 = irrelevant; investment choice: 1 = steady investment project,
2 = risky investment project; gender: 1 = male, 2 = female
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.t001
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difference between the two groups that invested with gains from the operation task (A and C
in Fig 2, χ2 = .093, df = 1, p = 1.000, F = .044; logistic regression with covariates B = .377, p =
.588, Fig 3). In addition, there was no significant difference between any other two groups.
Discussion
Study 1 shows that people are more risk-seeking in investments when their principal is
obtained immorally. Indeed, investors’ risk preferences do not change when they invest with
money earned by neutral means even after engaging in deceptive actions. These results are in
line with our hypothesis. However, the difficulty of obtaining principal may work as a con-
founding variable because those who lied earned principal by copying descriptions, whereas
those who told the truth were required to organize descriptions on their own. Thus, it is possi-
ble that difficulty in obtaining principal influences investors’ conservatism. We attempted to
rule out this explanation in study 2.
Study 2 The mediating effect of guilt
Study 2 aimed to test the mediating effect of guilt and to simultaneously control the difficulty
of obtaining principal as a confounding variable. Participants in the two groups invested with
direct gains from moral or immoral behaviors, and reported their guilt before investment.
Unlike study 1, the two groups with morality-irrelevant capital were not included in this study.
Context-related emotional experiences other than guilt were measured and analyzed as covari-
ates to remove their influence on outcomes. Participants’ reflective moral attentiveness (the
extent to which the individual regularly considers moral matters) was also measured as a
covariate such that individuals’ processing depth of moral-related information could be con-
trolled in both groups.
Methods and materials
Study 2 included 91 students from the Zhejiang University BBS who voluntarily joined. The
payment rules were the same as those in study 1.
Fig 3. Interaction of morality of description and principal’s relevance to description on investment
choice.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.g003
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Each participant first took part in a 10-minute boring task on a computer. They repeatedly
moved a sliding block from one end of a line to another on the screen with a mouse and earned
¥10 for performing that task. The participants then rated the interestingness of the operation
task and were asked to lie or tell the truth in a description following the task. They were told
that their descriptions would be read by potential participants in the future and that they
would earn ¥10 for their description. Unlike study 1, the participants in both groups chose and
copied 3 out of 15 sentences provided by the experimenter to even out the difficulty of the
description task. For the immoral principal group, all 15 sentences described the operation
task as extremely interesting and attractive. For the moral principal group, the 15 sentences
provided descriptions ranging from extremely boring to extremely interesting, and the partici-
pants could choose what best expressed their feelings. Following this task, participants rated
how strong their feelings were (“angry, happy, tired, shy, guilty, calm, confident, sad, surprised
and anxious”) on a 7-point scale (1 = not strong at all, 7 = extremely strong). Then, they joined
the same investment game (with ¥10 from the description task as principal) as in study 1.
However, instead of making choices, the participants each circled a number in a picture (Fig
4) to express their relative preference for investment projects.
The participants finished the reflective moral attentiveness scale (see S1 File) by Reynolds
[40] after the game and were then paid ¥10 each. Eight participants were randomly chosen one
week after the experiment to receive their gains from the investment game. Subjects were
informed in advance about the arrangement but were not clear about the proportions.
Results
Twelve participants were excluded for rating the operation task as interesting or showing
doubt regarding the situation. Thus, 79 (30 males, age M = 20.68, SD = 2.50) participants
remained. The two groups were not significantly different in age, gender composition, or in
the subjective interestingness of the operation task.
The numbers that the participants circled in investment game were converted into scores
from -4 (completely prefer steady investment project) to 4 (completely prefer risky investment
project). They were then normalized via the Bloom method based on their rank in SPSS
because they did not comply with a normal distribution. A t-test revealed that individuals who
invest with immoral principal (M = .27, SD = .94) prefer the risky project more (T = 2.72,
df = 77, p = .008, Cohen’s d = .62) than those investing with moral principal (M = -.29, SD =
.86). Ratings of the emotional experiences and scores on the reflective moral attentiveness
scale also did not fit the normal distribution. A rank sum test showed that individuals who lied
experienced more anger (p = .050), shyness (p = .002), surprise (p = .012), anxiety (p = .008),
Fig 4. Measurement of investment preference.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.g004
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and guilt (p = .000), and less calm (p = .032) than those who told the truth. Participants in the
two groups did not differ in their reflective moral attentiveness (p = .741). Bootstrapping
(N = 5000, see S2 File) method [41] was used in the mediation test. Normalized ratings of
anger, shyness, surprise, anxiety, calm and reflective moral attentiveness (Cronbach’s alpha =
.798) were entered as covariates altogether. 95% CI of the indirect effect was (.0338, 1.1126),
and 95% CI of the direct effect was (-.4620, 1.7853). Therefore, feelings of guilt fully mediate
the relationship between principal source morality and investors’ risk preferences (Fig 5). No
mediation effect was found for any other emotions.
Discussion
Study 2 replicated the impact of the morality of the source of principal on investors’ risk prefer-
ences after controlling for the difficulty of obtaining the principal and the depth of assessing
moral-related information. More importantly, a full mediation effect of guilt was revealed: indi-
viduals with immoral principal were guiltier, and they risked more in their investments as a result.
Participants in the immoral group were forced to behave unethically to earn their principal.
As the results show, negative emotions were aroused, including anger, surprise, and anxiety.
Analyzing these emotions as covariates makes the explanation via guilt more convincing.
Both study 1 and study 2 took lying as the example of an immoral principal source, which
may undermine the external validity. Thus, a new situation was introduced in study 3.
Study 3 The mechanism of guilt’s impact on risk preference
Study 3 aimed to examine two mechanisms of how guilt leads to higher risk preference: the
desire to reduce guilt by distancing oneself from immoral capital, and the decreased subjective
valuation of immoral capital. These mechanisms would be tested in two different contexts (3a
and ab). Due to concerns regarding research ethics, manipulation was achieved using imagina-
tion in this study.
Study 3a
Methods and materials. Study 3a employed a sample of 80 students at Zhejiang Univer-
sity. Each participant received a ¥5 participant fee. The entire procedure was conducted in the
Visual Basic program.
The participants first completed an imagination task. Sentences creating a complete story
appeared one by one on the screen. Participants read each sentence carefully and imagined
themselves as the leading character in that story.
Fig 5. Full mediation effect of guilt.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.g005
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The story of the [moral/immoral] principal group proceeded as follows:
You were invited to join a psychological experiment involving a one-hour operation task. The
experiment was extremely boring and you eventually finished it. When you finished, the experi-
menter gave you a present as a reward. While sending you away, the experimenter received a
phone call. The experimenter talked on the phone for a while and came to you, covering the
mobile receiver. The experimenter told you that the caller was a student interested in the experi-
ment. That student was not sure whether to join the experiment, so the student wanted to know
the feelings of past participants. The experimenter asked you to describe [your true feelings to help
the calling student decide/ the experiment as extremely interesting to attract the calling student to
join] and promised to give you ¥10 for doing so. You described [your truthful feelings on the
phone and advised the calling student not to come/ the experiment as extremely interesting on the
phone as requested by the experimenter]. After you hung up, the experimenter gave you ¥10.
Each sentence lasted for 10 seconds on the screen, so the entire imagination task lasted 100
seconds. After the story, the participants were asked how much they received as the leading
character in the story. Then, the participants rated their guilt about earning the ¥10 on a
9-point scale (1 = not guilty at all, 9 = extremely guilty). The students continued to imagine
using the earned ¥10 to invest (the same game as in studies 1 and 2) and chose the project they
preferred. Then, they ranked 4 goals (“to ensure gains”, “to maximize gains”, “to reduce guilt”
and “others”) according to each goal’s importance in deciding which investment project to
choose (1 = most important, 4 = least important). All participants then spent 30 seconds read-
ing the entire story again to reinforce their memory. Finally, pictures showing a pin, a card
case, a paper cup, and a lollipop appeared on the screen in turn, and the participants estimated
how many objects in the picture the ¥10 principal could buy, one after another. Before leaving,
the participants were paid and then were asked to guess the experiment’s aim.
Results. No one correctly guessed the aim of the experiment. Twelve participants were
removed because they failed to answer the question after the imagination game. Thus, 68 par-
ticipants (18 males, age M = 23.32, SD = 4.17) remained. Individuals with immoral earnings
were guiltier (Mann-Whitney U test, p = .000) and were more likely to prefer the risky invest-
ment project (64.7% vs. 35.3% to choose project B, χ2 = 5.882, df = 1, p = .028, F = .294) than
those with moral earnings.
We subtracted the rank of each goal from 5 to obtain the goal’s relative importance for mak-
ing investment decision. Larger numbers indicate higher importance (Table 2). The relative
importance of none of the 4 goals differed between the 2 groups (Mann-Whitney U test). A
two-step bootstrap (N = 5000, mediator 1 = feeling of guilt, mediator 2 = relative importance
of “to reduce guilt”, see S2 File) analysis [41] revealed that motivation to reduce guilt was not
the reason for choosing the risky investment project after feeling guilty (95% CI of the indirect
effect was (-.0439, .3194)).
The estimated numbers of objects the principal could buy (Table 3) did not follow a normal
distribution. The study constructed a subjective value index by first normalizing and standard-
izing the numbers all participants given to each object (to remove differences caused by the
objects’ characteristics), and then added up each participant’s 4 transformed numbers. The
Table 2. The relative importance of every goal.
Goal 3a 3b
Moral principal group Immoral principal group Moral principal group Immoral principal group
To ensure gains 3.26 (.99) 2.97 (.97) 3.33 (.96) 2.86 (1.03)
To maximize gains 2.71 (1.00) 2.97 (1.06) 2.89 (1.06) 13.03 (.92)
To reduce guilt 1.97 (.80) 2.29 (2.29) 1.94 (.92) 1.80 (1.02)
Others 1.97 (1.14) 1.76 (1.05) 1.83 (.78) 2.29 (1.10)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.t002
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index of immoral principal (M = -.23, SD = 2.09) does not differ from that of moral principal
(M = .21, SD = 2.74). A two-step mediation effect of guilt and the principal’s subjective value
was significant (bootstrap, N = 5000, mediator 1 = feeling of guilt, mediator 2 = subjective
value index, 95% CI was (.0622, .9902), see S2 File). Thus, individuals who lied to earn the
principal are guiltier, so they consider the principal as less valuable and therefore more readily
invested it in riskier projects.
Study 3b
The sample in study 3b consisted of 80 Zhejiang University students. All steps (imagination
task, imagination check, rating of guilt, imagined investment, sorting of goals based on their
importance, estimation of principal’s value) and materials were the same as 3a, except for the
imagined stories.
The story for the [moral/ immoral] principal group was as follows:
You were in line at the checkout counter in a convenience store near your school, it was
crowded in the store and the line was very long. M, a customer who had just checked out, hur-
ried out of the door. You saw that M had not zipped up his pocket, and a pile of money fell out
of his pocket. M did not notice it, and there was no other witness when you looked around.
You left the line and exited the store to pick up the money [and returned it to M. M was very
grateful, and M pulled ¥10 out of the pile to give you as a reward. M insisted that you take the
money before M left, and you finally took it /prepared to return it to M. Before catching up
with M, you pulled ¥10 from the pile and kept it yourself. When you stopped M and gave M
the remaining money, M was not suspicious and appeared grateful].
Nine participants were excluded for failing the question after imagination. Thus, 71 (32
males, age M = 21.44, SD = 2.30) participants remained. The analytical steps in study 3b mir-
rored those in study 3a. Participants with immorally gained principal were more likely to
choose the risky investment project (65.7% v.s. 38.9%, χ2 = 5.117, df = 1, p = .033, F = .268),
and they also felt guiltier (Mann-Whitney U test, p = .000).
The relative importance of each of the 4 goals was compared between the 2 groups, and no
differences were found. A two-step mediation effect with feelings of guilt and the relative
importance of reducing guilt as mediators was not significant (bootstrap, N = 5000, 95% CI =
(-.1309, .6335), see S2 File).
The subjective value index for immorally earned principal (M = -.34, SD = 2.49) did not dif-
ferent from that of morally earned principal (M = .30, SD = 2.73). A two-step mediation effect
of feelings of guilt and the principal’s subjective value index as mediators was significant (boot-
strap, N = 5000, 95% CI = (.0135, .9705), S2 File).
Discussion
With 2 parallel studies, study 3 replicated the effect of the principal source morality in a new
context with a new manipulation method. More importantly, it revealed the mechanism
Table 3. Estimated numbers of objects principal can buy.
Objects 3a 3b
Moral principal group Immoral principal group Moral principal group Immoral principal group
Pin 156.65 (269.80) 120.38 (178.94) 161.06 (231.98) 76.29 (48.39)
Card case 51.15 (173.92) 8.09 (11.38) 14.92 (26.49) 9.83 (11.72)
Paper cup 25.56 (31.16) 24.59 (37.31) 31.28 (41.54) 26.17 (25.65)
Lollipop 13.71 (16.42) 12 (8.84) 14.39 (9.78) 16.89 (19.15)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.t003
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behind the impact of guilt on investment choices: guilty individuals undervalue their immor-
ally earned principal, such that they will risk it more readily for a larger profit (Fig 6). In con-
trast with one of the former hypotheses, the assumption of reducing guilt by distancing oneself
from immorally earned principal was not proven.
The effect size of study 3a and 3b (both small) was smaller than those in the previous 2 stud-
ies (both medium). The authors believe this result was caused by the weaker effect of manipu-
lation by imagination than manipulation by a real task.
General discussion
Main results
Study 1 revealed that investors risk more when their principal is earned unethically, and their
risk preferences do not change when they invest with morally earned capital after engaging in
immoral behavior. Study 2 showed that feelings of guilt fully mediates the relationship between
the principal source morality and investors’ risk preference. Employing 2 sub-studies, study 3
found that guilt increases investors’ risk preference by reducing the subjective value of immor-
ally earned principal. The study also generalized its findings to new contexts based on a new
manipulation method.
Nevertheless, the hypothesis regarding people’s motivation to distance themselves from
immoral principal by choosing the risky project was not proven. In our opinion, it is possible
that people perceive gains from investments as distinct from principal. Therefore, principal
will be distanced as long as they invest regardless of the project they choose, which is similar to
money laundering. It is also possible that all people care about during investments is the best
monetary outcomes, and they engage in other efforts to relieve guilt before or after investing.
Impact of principal source morality on risk preference
The findings in this article support mental account theory, which emphasizes that the con-
sumption of money can be affected by differences in the way in which it is acquired. In this
research, the difference lies in moral meaning. According to the classical definition of mental
account[16], principals with various moral meanings do not belong to distinct accounts, par-
ticularly when they are both given by the experimenter as a reward for descriptions and when
the difficulty of descriptions is matched. This research adds moral meaning as a new dimen-
sion of classification in mental accounts. It also reveals that mental accounts distinguished by
the morality of the source of capital affect investments via feelings of guilt and subjective
values.
In this research, the impact of immorally earned principal does not generalize to invest-
ments with moral principal after unethical practices. This contrasts with research by Xie et al
Fig 6. Schematic diagram of two-step mediation effect in study 3.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0175181.g006
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[24], in which participants held negative attitudes toward all money because they blamed cer-
tain money for causing misbehaviors. In our opinion, this result is grounded in the difference
between “money as cause” and “money as outcome”. When money causes evil behaviors, any
money of the same (or larger) amount may have the same effect such that all money is consid-
ered evil. By contrast, when money acquires immoral meanings because it is a direct gain from
certain moral transgressions, money unrelated to that particular misconduct remains clean.
Therefore, investment behaviors with clean money will not change.
Impact of guilt on risky decision making
Combining past research with the present studies, we propose that guilt’s influence on risky
decision making can be affected by whether the cause of guilt and the ensuing decision making
derive from the same context.
When the cause of guilt is unrelated to subsequent choices, guilt works on a general level.
Based on appraisal tendency theory [5], Kouchaki, Oveis, and Gino[42] found that guilty peo-
ple take more risks in investments because feeling responsible for something bad increases
their sense of control. This type of context-independent guilt did not play a role in our research
because those who invested with irrelevant money after lying in study 1 did not change their
risk preference. In our opinion, this result is because participants behaved immorally at the
experimenter’s behest rather than purely of their own volition in this research, such that their
sense of control was not enhanced.
When the cause of guilt and decision making derive from the same context, the effect of
guilt are closely linked to specific features of the context. Mancini and Gangemi[43] conducted
research in which participants felt guilty for an imagined traffic violation before choosing
from two fining options with different risks. Guilt increased their desire to be punished, so
they tended to process information in a loss framework, which leads to riskier choices[9]. Sim-
ilarly, guilt in this research plays its role in a context-relevant way: by influencing the subjective
value of gains from guilt-inducing behaviors. Under these circumstances, researchers must
analyze in a “context-sensitive” manner to understand the impact of guilt.
Contributions and implications for future researches
Theoretically, this research adds to the moral dimension of capital as an influential factor on
individual’s investment behavior. Both the impact of principal source morality and its mecha-
nism are revealed in this study. In addition, this research challenges the assumption of money’s
simple fungibility and further supports mental account theory. The findings from this research
also suggest a new way to analyze the role of emotions in decision makings. As a practical mat-
ter, the outcomes indicate that a capital market with a high percentage of immorally gained
principal may experience more risky investments. These investment preferences might pro-
duce economic vitality in the short-term while posing a threat on the long-term healthy, stable
and sustainable economic development. Therefore, it is important to economic growth to
reduce the percentage of immoral principal and increase the percentage of moral principal via
more effective financial supervision of the capital market.
Despite the significances of this study, it nonetheless has its limitations. First, all participants
were students who had little experience with investments, and they invested in a game with a
maximum gain of ¥35. Studying experts in real investments would results in more convincing
outcomes. Second, participants in the immoral principal groups were forced to behave badly
or to imagine doing so. Conceptually, this is different from actively choosing to profit from
immoral behaviors. Therefore, the present findings cannot be widely generalized. In study 3b,
the participants imaged taking the initiative to behave immorally, and their investment and its
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mechanism did not differ from their peers in study 3a. Although this may imply that those two
circumstances share some similarity with regard to risky investments, more evidence from
strictly manipulated experiments are needed before any conclusions can be drawn. Whether
investors’ risk preferences will change when they freely choose to earn their principal immorally
is worth exploring. Third, investors’ risk preference would be affected not only by morality of
principal obtaining means and guilt, but also by traits such as risk tendency and sense of moral-
ity. Although the latter was ruled out to some extent by random groups and covariates in the
analysis, it is worth exploring in the future how risk preference and sense of morality as charac-
teristics can moderate the effect of principal source morality. Finally, the moral meaning of
money can be influenced in more ways [21] than how it is earned. Paying more attention to
other dimensions such as whom it is received from, by what kind of government it is issued,
and where would the gains to investment flow and comparing the effects of these dimensions
with the means of obtaining money seems a promising direction for future research.
Conclusions
Employing three studies, this research proves that people engage in riskier investments when
their principal is earned immorally. Feelings of guilt caused by immoral means of earning cor-
rupts the value of that principal and increases people’s willingness to risk it for larger gains.
This effect is stable across various contexts and different methods of manipulation. However,
this effect disappears when people invest with neutral principal after engaging in wrongdoing.
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